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From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The
Revival of Theory in Statutory
Interpretation
Philip P. Frickey*
From my limited and perhaps biased perspective, at least,
the past decade has probably been the most fruitful in history
for legal academics in the field of legislation. These develop-
ments have largely eluded the attention of many of our faculty
colleagues, however, as well as the practicing bar. Moreover,
the excitement that some of us find in the field has not always
translated well into our classrooms. My goals in this essay are
to explain to outsiders--our students, our colleagues, and our
fellow attorneys-why scholarship in legislation has exploded
and why pedagogy in legislation is important and challenging.
My hope is that this "update from the front" will stimulate a
greater appreciation for the field and, more particularly, a
stronger sense for the centrality of legislation theory in the law
school curriculum and in the practice of law.
"The Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation" is, ad-
mittedly, an inauspicious title for this endeavor. Most people,
including most with legal training, probably consider statutory
interpretation to be dreary, a bit like biblical interpretation
without the poetic language and the promise of eternal payoff.
Indeed, a revival of theory in statutory interpretation sounds
like a return to the forbiddingly abstract about the drearily
obscure.
Even more abstruse is the other part of the title: "From
the Big Sleep to the Big Heat." The Big Sleep and The Big Heat
are movies of the genre "film noir"-"dark film." In the late
1970s, statutory interpretation was in a big sleep; since then, it
has become a hot topic in both academic and judicial circles.
Furthermore, on the surface at least, statutory interpretation is
* Faegre & Benson Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. This es-
say is an expanded and footnoted version of a lecture given on March 3, 1992,
to inaugurate the Faegre & Benson Professorship at the University of Minne-
sota Law School. William Eskridge, Daniel Farber, and several editors of the
Minnesota Law Review provided helpful comments on an earlier draft.
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"law noir"-dark, as in obscure. I will appropriate the chrono-
logical structure that this allusion to film provides in an at-
tempt to shed some light on this murky subject.
I.
First, the big sleep. When I was a law student in the mid-to
late 1970s, statutory interpretation was of little academic inter-
est. Indeed, writing as recently as 1983, Robert Weisberg accu-
rately reported that "[t]he general contemporary American
view of statutory interpretation is that there is not a great deal
to say about the subject. As a result, nothing else as important
in the law receives so little attention."' Hence, while tax
professors might wax eloquently on the interpretation of tax
statutes and regulations, at most only their tax colleagues
would listen. Hardly anybody in legal academe thought that
something useful could be said about the interpretation of stat-
utes in general. Although professors presumably hoped that
students would pick up skills in interpreting statutes, the gen-
eral curricular mood was one of benign neglect, summed up in
the notion that we teach so many statutory courses that the
students will pick up these skills by osmosis. This is the "per-
vasive method" of teaching statutory interpretive skills, which
is not so much a method as a default.2
In contrast, the practicing bar of the 1970s was differently
situated. It had to worry about statutory interpretation because
that was what a great many lawyers did for a good deal of their
time. As Guido Calabresi has pointed out, twentieth-century
law has become heavily "statutorified.' '3 Translating this Yale-
speak into English, what Calabresi meant was that statutes, not
the common law, provide the boundaries for most legal inquiry.
And so, of course, good practitioners needed to be capable of
making effective statutory arguments and to be confident in
their ability to advise clients on statutory problems.
Practitioners of that era who sought guidance on statutory
interpretation found little available. No single theory domi-
1. Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the
New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213 (1983) (footnote omitted).
2. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the C7ass-
room and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 802 (1983) [hereinafter
Posner, Statutory Interpretation] (teachers of statutory courses barely find the
time to cover the substantive material and are presented with casebooks that
do not attempt to address the larger issues of statutory interpretation).
3. GuIDo CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1
(1982).
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nated the statutory interpretation decisions of that period, and
there was little debate about the comparative utility of the
plausible approaches. The Supreme Court of the United States
sometimes seemed interested in following the plain language of
a statute,4 more frequently seemed to consider congressional in-
tent as the linchpin of statutory meaning,5 and occasionally
spun off in more abstract and unpredictable directions, for ex-
ample by relying upon the "spirit" or purpose of the statute 6 or
by bending apparent statutory meaning in the direction of con-
stitutional values.7 The only doctrines that might have served
as potential rules about statutory interpretation-the so-called
canons of construction-the Court invoked unpredictably.
8
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court made at least one outright
blooper. In the otherwise famous Overton Park case, the Court
absent-mindedly inverted the usual order of assessing statutory
meaning by concluding that, because the legislative history was
ambiguous, "it is clear that we must look primarily to the stat-
utes themselves to find the legislative intent."9 Mostly, how-
ever, the opinions of the Court were simply workmanlike-
recall that Justice O'Connor had not yet arrived. The Court
was also sometimes rather modest about its conclusions in stat-
utory cases. For example, in a case addressing whether to fol-
low the Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of
the Clean Air Act, the Court stated: "We therefore conclude
that the Agency's interpretation ... was 'correct,' to the extent
that it can be said with complete assurance that any particular
interpretation of a complex statute such as this is the 'correct'
one."1' 0 As an aside, I might note that, whatever else has been
gained recently by the revival of theory, the field has largely
lost the virtue of humility conveyed by these words written by
Justice Rehnquist in 1975."1
4. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978).
5. See, e.g., Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 681 & n.18
(1979).
6. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-04 (1979).
7. See, e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
8. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional
Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV.
593, 598-611 (1992) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement Rules]
(overview of Supreme Court usage of canons, circa 1981).
9. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 n.29
(1971).
10. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975).
11. My impression is that in the 1970s the state supreme courts were more
predictable in preferring to follow plain statutory meaning, probably because
in many states nothing looking like authoritative legislative history was avail-
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Indeed, in the 1970s the title to my lecture would be
viewed as containing a grammatical error. The sharp-eyed ob-
server would suggest that it should be entitled "the revival of
theory about statutory interpretation." For statutory interpre-
tation was seen as merely a thing one does, not a discrete sub-
ject one studies and analyzes.
II.
Now, the big heat. Today, in quite theoretical as well as
practical terms, statutory interpretation has become a legiti-
mate subject of academic inquiry and practical concern. It is
not wrong to posit a revival of theory in statutory interpreta-
tion. Academics interested in theories of statutory interpreta-
tion are no longer like theologians, engaged in a discipline in
which the very existence of the subject matter is open to dis-
pute by the scholars themselves- 2
In many academic disciplines, the catalyst for such a
change would have been the emergence of a new school of
thought. Consider the impact, for example, of deconstruction-
ism on theory in, again not about, literary criticism. In con-
trast, a turn toward theory in legal scholarship has often been
driven more by the real world of law-Supreme Court deci-
sions and the judicial appointment process, for example-than
simply by the minds of academics sitting in their offices at-
tempting to conjure up insights.13
able to compete for judicial attention. But any good practitioner must have
felt that, in many cases and regardless of the judicial forum, one simply made
all the arguments and ultimately tossed the question to the judges for
resolution.
12. The remark about theologians is stolen from Michael P. Malone, The
"New Western History, "An Assessment, in TRAiLS: TOWARD A NEW WESTERN
HISTORY 97 (Patricia Nelson Limerick et al. eds., 1991).
13. It is easy to make this point about what has often catalyzed theory in
constitutional law. For example, consider probably the most visible and most
hotly debated book on constitutional interpretation in recent times, John Hart
Ely's Democracy and Distrust, published in 1980. It is an impressive work, but
the impetus for its intellectual agenda seems clearly to have been actual deci-
sions by the Supreme Court. Specifically, Ely considered Brown v. Board of
Education and the reapportionment cases to be the most important Supreme
Court decisions of the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, respectively, and he con-
sidered them positive, indeed laudible, exercises of judicial review. In con-
trast, Ely viewed Roe v. Wade, the abortion case, as the most important
decision of the 1970s, and for Ely this was a negative, even disastrous, exercise
of judicial review. Seen from this background, his book becomes a straightfor-
ward way to generate a theory of judicial review that makes Brown and the
reapportionment cases easy decisions to justify and Roe an easy case to
condemn.
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With respect to statutory interpretation, as I will explain,
the emergence of a positive theory-one that purports to ex-
plain how the world operates-did have a major impact in the
early 1980s. Of course, it would be unlikely that any one the-
ory, or one judicial decision, or one jurist or academic commen-
tator could trigger a revival of statutory interpretation theory,
and, in fact, no such single causal agent can be plausibly as-
serted. Indeed, even a more modest account attempting to iso-
late a few primary catalyzing forces will necessarily be
oversimplified and perhaps even irksome in slighting competing
influences and ideologies. Nonetheless, I believe that it is possi-
ble to isolate the most important decision, the most important
emerging theory, and the most important people who triggered
the revival of interest in this subject. For me, that case is
United Steelworkers v. Weber,14 decided by the Supreme Court
in 1979; the theory is called public choice; and the people are
Richard Posner, Frank Easterbrook, and Antonin Scalia. I be-
gin with the case.
Weber involved Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corpora-
tion's Gramercy, Louisiana, plant. Until 1974 Kaiser had hired
only craftworkers with prior craft experience. Because the
craft unions had refused to admit African Americans, only 2%
of Kaiser's craftworkers were African American. This racial
imbalance in its workforce created a problem for Kaiser under
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.15 This is because in 1971,
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 16 the Supreme Court had held
that Title VII not only outlawed intentional discrimination
against racial minorities in employment, it also prohibited the
use of employment rules that had a strong and needlessly dis-
criminatory effect.
To correct the racial imbalance, Kaiser took two steps.
First, it abandoned the requirement that workers have prior
craft experience, and in its place offered on-the-job training to
teach some of its unskilled workers to do craftwork. Second, to
cure its bad numbers on racial exclusion quickly, Kaiser dic-
tated that craft trainees be selected by seniority, provided that
at least 50% of the new trainees be African American, until the
percentage of African American craftworkers approximated
the percentage of African Americans in the local work force.
Brian Weber, an unskilled white worker denied admission
14. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
16. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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into the training program, brought suit under Title VII. The
Supreme Court denied his claim, upholding the Kaiser plan as
consistent with Title VII, even though the majority opinion,
written by Justice Brennan, essentially conceded that Title
VII's plain language supported Weber.17 Quoting an 1892 case,
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,'8 Brennan said
that "it is a 'familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter
of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within
its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.' "19 The spirit
or purpose of Title VII, according to Brennan, was to open em-
ployment opportunities to previously excluded racial minori-
ties.20 Brennan concluded that it would be an ironic twist to
interpret the first federal statute attacking our history of racial
injustice in employment and benefitting historically disadvan-
taged peoples as prohibiting "all voluntary, private, race-
conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segre-
gation and hierarchy."21
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the statute could
not have been plainer-essentially it said, "do not discriminate
on the basis of race in employment"-and that this plain mean-
ing persuasively demonstrated the intentions of Congress.
22
Justice Rehnquist marshalled significant quotations from the
legislative history to reinforce his conclusion that Congress in-
tended the statute to compel color blindness in employment
decisions.2 3
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun conceded that
Justice Rehnquist may have had the better of the argument on
conventional sources of statutory meaning.2 4  But Justice
Blackmun voted for the Brennan result for practical reasons.
Kaiser was on a high tightrope without a net, said Blackmun:
if it did nothing to correct the large racial imbalance in its
workforce, it risked legal liability in an action brought by Afri-
can Americans; if it took direct action to correct the percentage
of racial imbalance, it risked legal liability to the Brian Webers
in its workforce.2 5 Justice Blackmun essentially presumed that
17. See 443 U.S. at 201.
18. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
19. 443 U.S. at 201.
20. See id. at 202-03.
21. Id. at 204.
22. See id at 226, 252-54 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., dissenting).
23. See id. at 230-55.
24. See id. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
25. See id. at 209-11.
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it cannot be the law that no matter which way Kaiser turned, it
was violating Title VII. So Justice Blackmun concluded that if
an employer finds an arguable violation of Title VII on its
hands, it may correct it by reasonable affirmative action
measures.
26
Weber was a very visible and important decision. In 1979,
the affirmative action issue was not just on the minds of many
judges, attorneys, legislators, academics, and other opinion lead-
ers, it was a matter of general conversation. Just the year
before, the Court had issued its famous Bakke decision, involv-
ing the constitutionality of a racial quota in admissions to a
state university's medical school.27
Weber was also a decision that for many legal observers
was difficult to justify. Was it really right, the legal community
began asking itself, for Justice Brennan to say that the "spirit
of the statute" may trump seemingly plain statutory text and
legislative intent? Did Justice Blackmun's practical resolution
of the case exceed the bounds of the judge's role in interpret-
ing, rather than amending, a statute?28
Recall that Brennan relied upon an 1892 case called Holy
Trinity Church for the proposition that the letter killeth but
the spirit giveth life. In my legislation course, I tell my stu-
dents that Holy Trinity Church is the case you always cite
when the statutory text is hopelessly against you, and the case
title lends some additional mirth to this observation. The tactic
of relying upon the case does sometimes resemble the "hail
Mary" pass in football. As a matter of attorney advocacy, that
may be all well and good, but as a matter of judicial resolution
of a critical social issue, it may seem like something altogether
different.
To defend Weber, then, one needed a theory of statutory
interpretation. Of course, to attack Weber one ought to have a
theory, too, but Justice Rehnquist had marshalled the conven-
tional sources of statutory meaning, and in so doing, he created
at least a presumption that the Court was wrong and threw
down the gauntlet for the creation of a theory under which it
would be right.
26. See ici
27. See Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
28. For an early dissent from Weber by a prominent academic, see Ber-
nard D. Meltzer, The Weber Case: The Judicial Abrogation of the Antidis-
crimination Standard in Employment, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 423 (1980).
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Since Weber, there has been an explosion in theoretical
writing about statutory interpretation. Indeed, immediately
following Weber, Ronald Dworkin, the prominent legal philoso-
pher, published an extended essay in the New York Review of
Books defending the outcome in that case.29 To get to the heart
of this new debate in statutory interpretation since Weber,
though, we need to turn not to the New York Review of Books
of the 1970s, but instead to the Harvard Law School of the
1950s, and to the best thinking about statutory interpretation of
that day. To understand that thinking, we must probe a bit of
legal history.
Notwithstanding the flexible approach to statutory inter-
pretation suggested by the 1892 opinion in Holy Trinity
Church, many Supreme Court decisions of the early twentieth
century seemed to view statutory interpretation as the mechan-
ical application of either statutory text3° or legislative intent31
to the interpretive problem at hand. During the 1930s, the so-
called legal realists that dominated legal scholarship effectively
attacked these formalistic approaches.32 The legal realists con-
tended that in many cases of statutory interpretation, judges
necessarily make, rather than find, the law. Many statutes lack
a "plain meaning." Moreover, the notion of legislative intent is
a myth, or more accurately an oxymoron, or contradiction in
terms, like military justice or slam dancing. How can 535 legis-
lators have an intent about anything? Because neither statu-
tory text nor legislative intent was universally determinate and
confining, the legal realists insisted that statutory interpreta-
tion often involved substantial judicial discretion and consti-
tuted judicial lawmaking, not lawfinding.
By the 1950s, the legal realists' critique of interpretive for-
malism had become deeply rooted. Nevertheless, there was a
growing yearning for less skepticism about judicial decision-
29. Ronald Dworkin, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Dec. 20, 1979, at 37, reprinted in RONALD DwORxIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
316 (1985).
30. See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
31. See, e.g., Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922).
32. Perhaps the most important critique is found in Max Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930), upon which the remainder of the
paragraph in the text is based. Other, later examples include Karl Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950); Arthur W.
Phelps, Factors Influencing Judges in Interpreting Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REV.
456 (1950).
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making as well. In materials entitled The Legal Process,33 two
Harvard professors, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, attempted to
synthesize an approach that would accommodate the legal real-
ist critique, yet provide meaningful rules that could constrain
judges and establish objective ways to critique judicial behavior.
Hart and Sacks agreed that plain meaning and legislative
intent, if applied mechanically, were absurd ways to resolve a
statutory question. For them, statutory law should not be fun-
damentally different from other law, like the common law and
constitutional law: all law is supposed to be rational and be
premised on intelligible purposes.f4 In other words, it is more
important to be functional and practical than it is to be literal
or to act as the faithful agent of the enacting legislature. In
this sense, Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Weber is a
direct descendent of Hart and Sacks.
But other elements of the Hart and Sacks model sounded
more like Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Weber. For
Hart and Sacks proposed a "purpose approach" to statutory in-
terpretation that is similar to that suggested in Holy Trinity
Church, the old precedent upon which Brennan relied in
Weber. Hart and Sacks suggested that the judge read the stat-
ute carefully and then conjure up plausible organizing purposes
for it. These purposes were supposed to be rational-indeed
they were presumptively good as well-since the court was to
assume that the legislature that passed the statute consisted of
"reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reason-
ably."35 Hart and Sacks did not consider legislative history off
limits in interpretation, but cautioned that it should be con-
sulted last, and then only as an aid in selecting among the plau-
sible overall purposes that had already been identified.36
Hart and Sacks provided the last prominent discussion of
statutory interpretation for over two decades.3 7 Accordingly,
commentators in the early 1980s considering statutory interpre-
33. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BA-
SIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tentative ed. 1958).
34. "[E]very statute and every doctrine of unwritten law developed by the
decisional process has some kind of purpose or objective .... " Id- at 166.
35. Id at 1415.
36. See id at 1284-86.
37. This observation slights the work of several people, especially that of
Reed Dickerson, whose work did not have an impact commensurate with its
quality. See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTES (1975). Dickerson's scholarship may well have suffered simply be-
cause the subject of statutory interpretation was held in such low esteem dur-
ing this period. For a comparatively recent analysis by another longstanding
1992]
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tation in general, or the Weber case in particular, necessarily
looked to Hart and Sacks for guidance. Hart and Sacks did
seem to support the Brennan opinion in Weber, but an aca-
demic development since the 1950s undermined reliance in the
1980s on Hart and Sacks, and implicitly undermined the Bren-
nan opinion in Weber as well. Here we have the appearance of
"public choice theory," that, when picked up by several promi-
nent academically-minded commentators turned judges, helped
catalyze the revival of statutory interpretation theory.
We encounter, first, the influence of Richard Posner. Fol-
lowing his appointment to the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner
necessarily began doing a good deal of statutory interpretation.
In short order, he also began writing about it, with his custom-
ary vigor.38
Posner found the Hart and Sacks framework a plausible
place to begin, but felt that a heavy dose of reality was in or-
der.39 Public choice theory, in which the methodology of eco-
nomics is applied to the democratic marketplace of the
legislature, 40 demonstrated, to Posner's satisfaction, that legis-
lators frequently were not "reasonable persons pursuing rea-
sonable purposes reasonably," and that statutes frequently did
not embody broad public policy purposes. From this law and
economics perspective, statutes were frequently the result of no
more than compromises struck in the legislature, often involv-
ing what we commonly call special interest groups. 41
The implications of public choice theory for statutory inter-
pretation are significant. From this perspective, the deals
struck in the legislature and embodied in statutes depend upon
interest group strength, which is not attributable to the sheer
numbers of people represented by the group, but rather by
whether the group can organize easily to promote its ends and
whether it can limit the benefits gained from its lobbying to its
membership. Small groups likely to receive discrete benefits or
suffer disproportionate burdens are more likely to organize and
and outstanding commentator, see J. WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STAT-
UTES (1982).
38. See Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Stat-
utes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982) [hereinafter Posner,
Economics].
39. See Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 819.
40. On public choice theory and law, see generally DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION
(1991).
41. See Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 819; Posner, Eco-
nomics, supra note 38, at 265-68.
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lobby effectively than the diffuse public. Hence, rather than
assume, along the lines of Hart and Sacks, that all statutes em-
body broad public-interest purposes, we should expect to find
lots of statutes that provide concentrated, unjustified benefits
to small groups at the expense of the general public.42
In this light, the Hart and Sacks purpose approach seems
to have two great flaws. First, principled judges could reach
wrong results by following Hart and Sacks, for they could end
up broadly promoting a public policy purpose gleaned from the
statute rather than following the true lines of legislative com-
promise.43 Second, willful, manipulative judges could reach
wrong results by attributing a purpose to the statute that just
happens to coincide with the judges' own policy preferences. 44
After all, if I ask what "reasonable people pursuing reasonable
purposes reasonably" would have wanted in a given context, am
I not likely to assume that those reasonable people are similar
to the reasonable person I know best-myself-and, thus,
would want what I think is the right answer? And wouldn't
this natural psychological phenomenon be grossly exaggerated
in willful judges, much to the danger of the rule of law?
For Posner-more accurately, for the Posner of the early
1980s 45-the appropriate modification of Hart and Sacks is to
jettison the idea of the judge flexibly attributing a public-policy
purpose to a statute. Instead, the judge should simply be the
faithful agent of the enacting legislature. The judge is sup-
posed to follow the lines of legislative compromise-to enforce
the legislative contract-warts and all. In most situations in
which those lines of compromise are not crystal-clear, Posner
asserted that judges should put themselves in the minds of the
enacting legislature and imaginatively reconstruct what the leg-
42. For a further discussion of interest groups and their impact on the
political process, see, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 40, at 12-37.
43. See Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 819.
44. See id. (to ignore reality of legislative process "runs the risk of attrib-
uting to legislation not the purposes reasonably inferable from the legislation
itself, but the judge's own conceptions of the public interest"); cf i& at 820-21
("The secret thoughts not only of many modern legal academics but of some
modern judges" are that a creative "misreading" of statutes might be neces-
sary to update statutes and counter injustice "where legislative amendment is
blocked by interest-group pressures" (citing CALABRESI, supra note 3, at 34,
38)).
45. Judge Posner's views on statutory interpretation have evolved, and his
most recent scholarly discussion of the subject reveals substantially more
skepticism about any "objective" method of statutory interpretation. See RICH-
ARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 275 (1990) [hereinafter
POSNER, PROBLEMS].
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islature would have done had it considered and resolved the
issue.46
Although Posner did not expressly apply this methodology
in the early 1980s to critique Weber, his approach obviously fol-
lows Justice Rehnquist's dissent in that case. Even if, unlike
Rehnquist, one concedes that the statutory language and legis-
lative history are not absolutely determinative of congressional
intent on the issue in Weber, these sources may seem clear
enough to allow, A la Posner, for an imaginative reconstruction
of probable legislative intent that supports the Rehnquist inter-
pretation. Posner's concerns about the responsible judge being
misled by, and the manipulative judge willfully misusing, a pur-
pose approach fit the Rehnquist critique of the Brennan opin-
ion in Weber well. Moreover, later writing by Posner has used
Weber as an example of a statutory interpretation problem that
is subject to analysis from the "legislation as compromise"
perspective.47
In the same 1983 issue of the University of Chicago Law
Review that contained Posner's proposal for imaginative recon-
struction in statutory interpretation, Frank Easterbrook, then a
Chicago professor, published an article calling for a revival in
literalism in statutory interpretation.48 Unlike Posner, who
simply wanted more realism in applying Hart and Sacks, Eas-
terbrook attempted to jettison all aspects of the Hart and Sacks
scheme.49 And, as with Posner, the critique and the positive
method suggested by Easterbrook were rooted in public choice
theory.
Looking to a different branch of public choice than that ex-
plored by Posner, Easterbrook argued that legislatures cannot
have intents or purposes. 50 Easterbrook relied on the "incoher-
ence" wing of public choice, which is based on "Arrow's theo-
rem," named after its Nobel Prize winning progenitor,
economist Kenneth Arrow.51 Arrow and his followers have
demonstrated that in any complex, multimember decisionmak-
46. See Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2, at 817-20.
47. See POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 45, at 283-86, 289, 291.
48. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533
(1983).
49. Although Easterbrook never took on Hart and Sacks directly, his re-
pudiation of their approach is apparent throughout his article, especially in
such statements as "judicial pursuit of the 'values' or aims of legislation is a
sure way of defeating the original legislative plan." Id& at 546.
50. See i&i at 547-48.
51. On the Arrovian problem in general, see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra
note 40, at 38-62, which provides support for the assertions in the text. Easter-
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ing institution, like a legislature, a phenomenon called "cycling
majorities" frequently occurs. In these situations, there is al-
ways a majority ready to abandon the winner of the last vote in
favor of another alternative. Of course, such endless cycling
does not actually happen in a real legislature, primarily because
it follows a fixed agenda. But in a sense, that just makes mat-
ters worse. In a situation where cycling majorities are present,
the ultimate outcome is merely the one of the many alterna-
tives to which the agenda leads, and therefore that outcome
seems to have no more majoritarian legitimacy than other al-
ternatives. This puts enormous power in the hands of the
agenda setter, for example, the committee chair. Another fac-
tor undermining any coherent notion of legislative intent is
strategic voting, such as logrolling.5 2 So why in the world, Eas-
terbrook contended, would anybody try to interpret statutes
based on legislative intents and purposes?
It comes as no surprise, then, that Easterbrook specifically
attacked Posner's imaginative reconstruction approach. For
Easterbrook, legislatures have no intention to reconstruct imag-
inatively; they have "only outcomes," not "'intents' or 'de-
signs.' ,,53 Moreover, these legislative outcomes, rooted in
complicated compromise and context, are usually inscrutable
even to judges examining them in good faith. "The number of
judges living at any one time who can, with plausible claim to
accuracy, 'think [themselves] into the minds of the enacting leg-
islators and imagine how they would have wanted the statute
applied to the case at bar,' may be counted on one hand."
' 4
Easterbrook laid down a new conservative challenge in
statutory interpretation. Rather than relying upon the inten-
tionalism of Rehnquist and Posner, Easterbrook posited a lit-
eral approach to interpretation.5 5 Read the text like a good
brook expressly relied upon Arrow's work. See Easterbrook, supra note 48, at
547 n.20.
52. Easterbrook described logrolling as a situation "in which legislators
express the intensity of their preferences by voting against their views on
some proposals in order to obtain votes for other proposals about which their
views are stronger." Easterbrook, supra note 48, at 548.
53. See id at 547.
54. Id- at 550-51 (quoting Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2,
at 817).
55. For a more recent discussion, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of
Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59
(1988). Compare In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.)
(analyzing Supreme Court precedents on whether legislative intent, shown by
legislative history, may trump plain meaning of statutory text).
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lawyer, Easterbrook seemed to say, and we will have predict-
ability, certainty, and less judicial transmogrification of statu-
tory meaning. Letting the text carry the full load is also more
consistent with our separation of powers, for the text is all that
the two houses of Congress vote on and the President signs.
After Easterbrook joined Posner on the Seventh Circuit,
the decisions by these two fine legal minds, and especially their
occasional sparrings, have provided textbook illustrations of the
competing models of statutory interpretation-better, unfortu-
nately, than any series of similar debates at the Supreme
Court.56 But if Posner and Easterbrook provided much of the
initial intellectual agenda for the revival of theory in statutory
interpretation, another jurist, Antonin Scalia, contributed most
of the fireworks.
In 1985, while a circuit judge, Scalia delivered a lecture at
several law schools that, to use a legal term of art, was an "in
your face" to the conventional mode of statutory interpreta-
tion.57 He promoted literalism along the lines of Easterbrook
and lodged a strident attack on the use of legislative history.
Scalia charged that legislative history is the product of legi-
slators at their worst-promoting private interest deals, strate-
gically posturing to mislead judges, or abdicating all
responsibility to their unelected staff, who create legislative
history at the behest of interest groups or to promote their own
private agenda.58 This critique embraces the realistic, even cyn-
ical, assumptions about politics that underlie public choice
theory.
As a Supreme Court Justice, Scalia has continued this at-
tack at almost every opportunity.59 One of my favorite quota-
tions from him comes from a separate opinion he wrote chiding
56. For my money, the best judicial exchange about the nature and meth-
odology of statutory interpretation during my professional career is found by
comparing United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Easterbrook, J.) with i& at 1331-38 (Posner, J., dissenting). The Supreme
Court affirmed the Easterbrook opinion in Chapman v. United States, 111 S.
Ct. 1919 (1991). The quality of the discussion in the majority and dissenting
opinions there falls short of the Easterbrook/Posner dialogue.
57. See Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History (delivered
between fall 1985 and spring 1986 at various law schools in varying forms) (on
file with the Minnesota Law Review).
58. For a related discussion in the same time frame by then-Judge Scalia,
see Hirschey v. FERC, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring).
59. A recent example is Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527, 534 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring). In Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct.
2476, 2484 n.4 (1991), however, the majority opinion stated that the use of leg-
islative history in statutory interpretation remains acceptable.
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the majority for taking into account legislative history that
cited some lower court decisions:
As anyone familiar with modern-day drafting of congressional com-
mittee reports is well aware, the references to the cases were in-
serted, at best by a committee staff member on his or her own
initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member at the suggestion
of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those references was not pri-
marily to inform the Members of Congress what the bill meant...
but rather to influence judicial construction. What a heady feeling it
must be for a young staffer, to know that his or her citation of ob-
scure district court cases can transform them into the law of the land,
thereafter dutifully to be observed by the Supreme Court itself.
60
Among other things, one might question the empirical as-
sertions Scalia has made about the creation and purposes of leg-
islative history.6 1 But the important point is that in Scalia, the
so-called "new textualism" found the right person-brilliant,
bold, and nothing if not persistent-at the right place (the
Supreme Court), at the right time, when there would be people
to educate and followers to lead among the Reagan-Bush
appointees.
The new textualism's sharp break with the old intentional-
ism of Rehnquist and Posner was evident when the Weber is-
sue returned to the Supreme Court in 1987, in Johnson v.
Transportation Agency,62 this time involving affirmative action
for women. The majority of the Court, again in a Brennan
opinion, allowed the affirmative action in question and refused
to reconsider Weber. In dissent, Scalia launched a strong at-
tack upon Weber from the perspective of the new textualism
and public choice theory.
Recall that Justice Rehnquist had argued that Weber was
wrong because it was inconsistent with legislative intent-the
importance of the text of Title VII was that it was the best evi-
dence of legislative intent.63 In contrast, in his Johnson dissent,
Scalia said that the fundamental error of Weber was aban-
doning the plain meaning of the text of Title VII as the linch-
pin of statutory meaning, not as the best evidence of legislative
intent.64 Scalia scathingly attacked the majority's refusal to re-
consider Weber. In response to the majority's assertion that
Congress had implicitly ratified Weber because no bill had ever
60. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment).
61. See, e.g., FAR3ER & FRICKEY, supra note 40, at 98.
62. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
63. See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
64. See 480 U.S. at 669-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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been introduced to change the outcome in that case, Scalia in-
yoked public choice analysis to provide a contrary empirical
explanation:
It is unlikely that today's result will be displeasing to politically
elected officials, to whom it provides the means of quickly accommo-
dating the demands of organized groups to achieve concrete, numeri-
cal improvement in the economic status of particular constituencies.
Nor will it displease the world of corporate and governmental em-
ployers... for whom the cost of hiring less qualified workers is often
substantially less--and infinitely more predictable-than the cost of
litigating Title VII cases and of seeking to convince federal agencies
by nonnumerical means that no discrimination exists. In fact, the
only losers in the process are the Johnsons of the country [Johnson
was the white male plaintiff in this case], for whom Title VII has been
not merely repealed but actually inverted. The irony is that these in-
dividuals-predominantly unknown, unaffluent, unorganized-suffer
this injustice at the hands of a Court fond of thinking itself the cham-
pion of the politically impotent.
6 5
Since the mid-1980s, the debate has raged among at least
three schools of statutory interpretation theory: the old inten-
tionalism, the old Holy Trinity Church purposivism, and the
new textualism. The Supreme Court remains up for grabs.
For every case that seems to be a victory of textualism,66 an-
other can be found that reflects more conventional intentional-
ist methodologies,6 7 and the purpose approach is not dead,
either.68 For the first time in a long while, perhaps the first
time ever, the Justices are frequently debating statutory inter-
pretation methodologies at a level of theory that far transcends
the details of the case at hand, and that implicates the very
question of the Court's interpretive role in a democracy.
69
65. Id. at 677.
66. Compare, e.g., Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146
(1992) (Thomas, J.) (textualist approach finding no superfluity between two
arguably redundant statutes) with id at 1150 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (legislative history and background confirm majority's interpreta-
tion) and i&L at 1150-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (majority
approach, although rendering one of two overlapping statutes largely superflu-
ous, correct because consistent with congressional intent).
67. Compare, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989)
(Stevens, J.) (imaginative reconstruction of legislative intent) with id at 528
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (textualist approach moderated by ca-
non of avoiding absurd constructions) and id at 530 (Blackmun, J., joined by
Brennan & Marshall, JJ.) (purpose approach).
68. Compare, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991) (Stevens, J.)
(purpose approach and imaginative reconstruction broadly promoting remedial
goals of Voting Rights Act) with id at 2369-76 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J. & Kennedy, J., dissenting) (textualist approach).
69. I must concede that my reliance on Weber, public choice, and the writ-
ings of Posner, Easterbrook, and Scalia is old news to some, and incomplete
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III.
This is not the place for an extended assessment of contem-
news to all. Other factors were, of course, also present in the early to mid-
1980s that made statutory interpretation a ripe field for new inquiry. At least
a brief acknowledgment of these influences is in order.
The most obvious factors were political and institutional. By the early
1980s, our long period of divided national government began to appear perpet-
ual in nature. In such a state of affairs, the very nature of statutes and their
interpretation become matters of great practical importance. Are statutes
truly the domain of the (Democratic) legislature? Or does the (Republican)
president have a role in statutory enactment? For example, might the pre-
sentment and veto provisions of Article I authorize the president to sign legis-
lation conditioned upon his own understanding of the bill-even if that
interpretation is in tension with the congressional understanding expressed in
the legislative history? Once a statute is enacted, is it, in Marbury-like fash-
ion, emphatically the province of the (Republican-appointed) judiciary to say
what the statute means-even through the use of interpretive techniques, like
textualism, that undercut the influence of (Democratic) congressional intent?
When the (Republican) executive branch promulgates regulations pursuant to
congressional delegations of rulemaking authority, may it take the current ad-
ministration's policies into account-even if it knows that the Congress has a
different ideological cut on the problem at hand? Suddenly, statutory inter-
pretation theory became relevant in the real world of national governance.
As was Congress, academe was ideologically alienated from the Supreme
Court and the executive branch by the early to mid-1980s. Public law scholars
had developed a rich trove of writing on constitutional interpretation, most of
it aimed at expanding the Supreme Court's role in protecting liberty and
equality-just when the Court itself veered rightward and became far less in-
terested in such matters. As constitutional law became almost a dead field for
liberals interested in the intersection of legal scholarship and practical law re-
form-a description that fits the great majority of public law scholars-the
scholarly "turn toward interpretation" necessarily became something of a turn
toward statutory inquiry. That Congress, as opposed to the executive and the
Court, had a far more compatible ideological perspective with these scholars
surely played a role as well.
For whatever reasons, in the early 1980s liberal commentators began
rediscovering statutory interpretation and the intersection of statutes and the
common law as subjects worthy of inquiry. In particular, Guido Calabresi's
book, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, published in 1982, provoked sig-
nificant scholarly commentary on the role of statutes in American law.
Although Calabresi concerned himself mostly with problems of statutory obso-
lescence rather than statutory interpretation, his approach intrigued a variety
of reviewers of his book to ponder interpretive questions as well. Indeed, it
was in a review essay of this book that Robert Weisberg said, as noted earlier,
see text accompanying note 1 supra, that nothing else as important as statu-
tory interpretation receives as little scholarly attention in the law.
With all due respect to Calabresi and other centrist and liberal scholars,
however, in my view there would have been no significant revival of attention
to statutory interpretation without the partisan divisions in our national gov-
ernment and the provocative and highly visible work of Posner, Easterbrook,
and Scalia, all of which called for a response. Easterbrook, Posner, and espe-
cially Scalia had the unique advantage of spreading their messages in judicial
opinions as well as in scholarly commentary. When the Dean at Yale pro-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
porary statutory interpretation controversies. I will take ad-
vantage of this format, however, to make a few observations.
In many ways, the emergence of the new textualism and
the consequences flowing from it have been healthy develop-
ments. Judges and attorneys must now focus more carefully on
one of the wiggliest of legal creatures, statutory language. No
one can oppose being against sloppy legal constructions. More
generally, the new textualism has challenged those of different
interpretive persuasions to defend their ideas, rather than sim-
ply to rely upon conventionalism or legerdemain in brief and
opinion drafting. The drive toward theory provoked by the
new textualism is rooted in important judicial pronouncements
and has significant practical consequences, demonstrating that
legal theory is relevant outside as well as inside the classroom
and faculty lounge.
In my judgment, however, the great virtue of the new tex-
tualism-its rigidity-is also its essential vice. I lack the faith
of the new textualists that human beings can come up with one
reading of a statute that compels the human mind to accept it
in the kinds of cases the Supreme Court gets-hard cases,
where the lower courts are divided and the stakes are high.
What may promote predictability and certainty in routine cases
is, I suggest, much less useful at this level.
Recently a prominent attorney told me the following joke,
which, he informed me, he heard from a high church official,
and thus I feel that I can repeat it without seeming sacrilegious.
What is the difference between a liturgist and a terrorist? You
can negotiate with a terrorist. If one substitutes "literalist" for
liturgist, the humor remains, in my opinion. The stridency and
self-assurance of the new textualism is not what we need in
identifying statutory meaning in hard cases. What the
Supreme Court should do, I submit, is not read long, compli-
cated federal statutes in isolation from the underlying social
contexts in which they reside, but rather consider itself, under
our separation of powers, a partner in the process of getting on
with the government of this country.70
In this sense, the appropriate methodological contrast to
pounds an interesting, new theory about statutes, one hopes that at least a ma-
jor portion of the scholarly community listens; but when a Supreme Court
Justice does the same, the entire legal community cannot help but react.
70. The Court's recent struggles with the long, detailed, and complicated
federal bankruptcy code reveal this tension. See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 112
S. Ct. 773 (1992); C. Robert Morris, Bankrupt Fantasy: The Site of Missing
Words and the Order of fllusory Events, 45 ARK. L. REV. 265 (1991); cf. Pos-
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the new textualism is not the old intentionalism or the old
purposivism-the "hail Mary" approach of Holy Trinity
Church. If we return to Weber one last time, we should con-
sider the opinion in that case that has been neglected in the lat-
ter portions of this essay-the concurring opinion of Justice
Blackmun. The flexibility displayed in that opinion contains
severe risks of judicial overreaching. But the candor in the
opinion allows observers to understand what the judge is doing;
in this instance, the judge was not hiding behind the old inten-
tionalism or the old purposivism. And I much prefer the con-
textual, bottom/up or inside/out quality of the way in which
Blackmun worked through the situation Kaiser faced, rather
than the top/down, imposed rigidity of textualism.71
It might be that the new textualism can hold its rigidity in
any context, but I doubt it. Indeed, a new development, little
noticed up to now, but of potentially great significance, is the
use of the canons of interpretation-and particularly, stringent
clear statement rules-to provide a safety valve when the new
textualism jeopardizes other values that strike a majority of the
current Court as salient.72 I could well be wrong, but I don't
think combining two layers of rule-like rigidity is likely to pro-
duce the kinds of interpretations that, in the long run, will re-
main robust in the legal community. Moreover, the value
judgments inherent in invoking these clear statement rules-
which prefer ordering by private elites to government regula-
tion, state sovereignty to national legislative authority, and ex-
ecutive rulemaking to congressional lawmaking-are anything
but neutral or inevitable.73
All this is too interesting to escape the attention of even
law professors, and indeed the debate about the new textualism
has fueled an explosion in the academic literature on statutory
interpretation. Recall again that, writing in 1983, Robert Weis-
berg accurately reported that "[t]he general contemporary
American view of statutory interpretation is that there is not a
NER, PROBLEMS, supra note 45, at 302 (correctness of an interpretation may be
"political rather than epistemic, pragmatic rather than apodictic").
71. For my own attempt to construct a contextual model of statutory in-
terpretation that considers statutory text, legislative intent, statutory pur-
poses, and other factors, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990)
[hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation].
72. See Eskridge & Frickey, Clear Statement Rules, supra note 8, at 611-
40.
73. See id. at 640-45.
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great deal to say about the subject. As a result, nothing else as
important in the law receives so little attention.' 74 In less than
a decade, almost the inverse has become true: people have had
so much to say about statutory interpretation that the scholarly
literature has become almost overwhelming.75 A veritable cot-
tage industry has developed in this area, and I was lucky to
have been an early investor. Not surprisingly, the Weber case
is frequently used in these writings as a prototypic example of a
hard statutory case-that is, a case in which the plausible theo-
ries conflict and the outcome is therefore quite theory-sensi-
tive.7 6 Moreover, public choice theory and the writings of
Posner, Easterbrook, and Scalia feature prominently.77
Rather than attempt an overview of these writings, which
others have done,78 in the space that I have remaining I would
like to use this new scholarship to suggest a relationship that is
74. Weisberg, supra note 1, at 213 (footnote omitted).
75. This assertion screams for a string citation, but that risks failing to
cite something worth citing (or that the author considers worthy of citation,
anyway). Hence, to support the assertion of an explosion in the literature, I
hope that it is sufficient simply to note that in the 1992 supplement to our
casebook, Bill Eskridge and I cited about fifty-five books, articles, and other
publications on statutory interpretation written since the casebook went to
press in 1987. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JL & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
ch. 7 (Supp. 1992).
At least one article does deserve special mention, however, for its early
recognition and response to the emerging controversies over statutory inter-
pretation in the 1980s. Just as the strands of public choice, textualism, and the
attack on the purpose approach began taking root, Jonathan Macey published
an important article attempting to justify the purpose approach for public
choice reasons. See Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUm. L.
REV. 223 (1986).
76. Compare, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpre-
tation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1488-94 (1987) (Weber as appropriate vehicle
for judicial evolutive statutory interpretation) with Daniel A. Farber, Statu-
tory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 302-06 (1989)
(Weber as probable violation of norm of legislative supremacy). Judge Pos-
ner's recent book discusses Weber as a paradigm case of statutory indetermi-
nacy. See POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 45, at 283-86, 289, 291.
77. For recent writings on public choice, see, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Be-
yond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading
of Statutes, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1991); Symposium on the Theory of Public
Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988). Scholars are now turning to a somewhat
different form of analyiis, positive political theory, that may have more prom-
ise in illuminating public law problems. See Symposium, Positive Political
Theory and Public Law, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992).
78. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statu-
tory Interpretation: Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem of
Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767, 773-76 (1991); Peter Schanck, The
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frequently posited but rarely defended. The turn toward the-
ory in statutory interpretation is a validation that there is actu-
ally an important relationship between legal scholarship and
law teaching. For example, Posner's important 1983 article set-
ting out the theory of imaginative reconstruction was entitled
"Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Court-
room."79 Posner argued that law professors were overlooking
two separate but highly related problems-how statutes should
be interpreted, and how law schools should teach these skills to
students.8 0 One of the reasons that, in 1983, Bill Eskridge and
I, as brand-new law professors, started putting together a legis-
lation casebook 8 l was the sense that our own legal educations
had not prepared us for the everyday practice of modern,
statutorified law. Once we started in that project, it became
clear that legal theory in this area was muddled, to the extent
that it had not been forgotten.
Patricia Nelson Limerick, a brilliant historian and the
leader of the scholarly movement called the "New Western
History," reports that she first began to reconsider the domi-
nant paradigm in the history of the American West when she
concluded that she simply was not teaching the subject effec-
tively to her students. She has written:
In order to realize how completely you are entrapped by traditional
thinking, you must entrap yourself repeatedly in front of a group of
eighteen-to-twenty-two-year-olds. If you are a decent and fair
teacher, then eventually you will no longer feel comfortable at impos-
ing on their deference. At a certain point, you will finally have to say
to them (and, more important, to yourself), "What I am offering you
in the way of a big interpretation does not make very much sense."8 2
That happened to me when I started teaching a course in
legislation. The "big interpretation" of how courts construe
statutes did not make much sense, and I finally gave up trying
to windowdress the problems in the old intentionalism or the
Only Game in Town: An Introduction to Interpretive Theory, Statutory Con-
struction, and Legislative Histories, 38 KAN. L. REV. 815 (1990).
79. Posner, Statutory Interpretation, supra note 2.
80. For a more extended discussion also developed in the early 1980s, see
Robert Williams, Statutory Law in Legal Education: Still Second Class After
All These Years, 35 MERCER L. REV. 803 (1984).
81. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
(1988).
82. Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Trail to Sante Fe: The Unleashing of
the Western Public Intellectual, in TRAILS, TOWARD A NEW WESTERN HIS-
TORY, supra note 12, at 59, 68.
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old purposivism. In particular, merely teaching the Weber case
several times triggered my interest in many larger issues.
My experience is far from unique. When one examines the
recent theoretical writings on statutory interpretation, one
finds that the articles do attempt to propose a general theory of
interpretation, rather than the field-specific theory that would
have fit the perspective of the 1970s. That is, whether the au-
thor is a tax professor8 3 or an immigration law professor8 or an
environmental law professor, the article attempts to say
something about statutory interpretation in general. But the
article also contains examples of statutory interpretation, of
course, and it should come as no surprise that the examples fre-
quently parallel the author's field of substantive expertise. Tax
professors use tax cases,8 6 environmental law professors use en-
vironmental cases,8 7 and so on. This work can lead these schol-
ars or others to produce field-specific work-work that takes
the general theory and examines how a field of law would hold
up under it. 88
I suppose that no model of the relationship of scholarship
and teaching is just right, but this one strikes me as at least
especially useful. From a scholarly perspective, the back and
forth movement between general theory and field-specific anal-
ysis can make substantial contributions at three levels: the the-
oretical, the doctrinal, and the practical (for practitioners may
find the work especially accessible and useful). From a peda-
gogical perspective, there are also significant advantages. Forc-
ing students to recognize that one must have a theory, or at
least a defensible and replicable method, to resolve hard statu-
tory cases can significantly illuminate the practical lesson that
law is not a system of rules so much as a collision of theories in
a professional interpretive community. The further lesson is
83. See William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpre-
tation, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 541 (1988).
84. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87
MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988).
85. See Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989).
86. See Popkin, supra note 83, at 577-78, 601, 603, 607, 615.
87. See Farber, supra note 85, at 294-302.
88. My own experience certainly fits this model. Shortly after finishing
the casebook and a co-authored piece with Bill Eskridge on a general theory of
statutory interpretation, see Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation,
supra note 71, I then applied that theory in an article concerning my field of
specific interest, federal Indian law. See Philip P. Frickey, Congressional In-
tent Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78
CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1990).
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that these collisions may reach equilibria somewhat differently
depending upon the field of law involved; for example, we may
care more about plain meaning or legislative intent in some cir-
cumstances than others.8 9
The optimistic note upon which I close should not obscure
the stakes involved in the revival of theory in statutory inter-
pretation. Even in the bright light of this new analytical morn-
ing, statutory interpretation may appear merely to be a rarified
debate over "the meaning of meaning" among pedantic judges
and their academic running dogs. Instead, at its core this battle
is over redefining (or perhaps defining precisely for the first
time) the relationship among the three branches of our na-
tional government. It is no coincidence that this tension has
arisen in an era of longstanding and bitterly divided
government.
For example, surely one consequence of textualism, and
the concomitant repudiation of identifying and following legis-
lative intent, is to make it more difficult for Congress to have
its way. Although I do not believe that the battle boils down
simply to the conservative Republican executive branch and
Court versus the liberal Democratic Congress, 9° it would be
foolish to ignore the concrete consequences of the debate and
consider it merely in rarified academic terms.
A recent dispute provides a vivid example. Under 42
U.S.C. § 1988, as amended in 1976, in certain civil rights cases
the court may allow the prevailing party "a reasonable attor-
ney's fee as part of the costs." 9' Are fees paid to experts hired
by attorneys to assist in preparing the case and to testify at trial
recoverable as part of these fees? Writing amidst a division in
the circuits, Judge Posner held for the Seventh Circuit that ex-
pert fees were recoverable.92 Posner read several Supreme
Court precedents as rejecting a "plain language" approach to
§ 1988, and more fundamentally concluded that appeals to
unadorned plain language are unsound. He then opted for an
inquiry based on legislative intent and purpose, and concluded:
When a court can figure out what Congress probably was driving at
89. The pathbreaking article in this regard is Eskridge, supra note 76.
90. For an argument along these lines more subtle and more plausible
than my comment, see Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit,
1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 399. See also supra note 69 (discussing the effect of a di-
vided national government upon theories of statutory interpretation).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
92. Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted
and judgment vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1383 (1991).
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and how its goal can be achieved, it is not usurpation ... for the court
to complete (not enlarge) the statute by reading it to bring about the
end that the legislators would have specified had they thought about
it more clearly or used a more perspicuous form of words. 93
The issue ultimately reached the Supreme Court. In West
Virginia Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,94 Justice Scalia's majority
opinion repudiated the Posner approach as "profoundly mis-
tak[ing] our role,195 and, not surprisingly, opted for textualism.
According to Scalia, judges are obliged to enforce unambiguous
statutory language, for otherwise a "usurpation" occurs in
which the judge's own policy perspectives control the out-
come.96 For Scalia, "[t]he record of statutory usage demon-
strates convincingly that attorney's fees and expert fees are
regarded as separate elements of litigation cost" because,
although some statutes, "like § 1988, refer only to 'attorney's
fees,' . . . many others explicitly shift expert witness fees as
well as attorney's fees. '97
In a strong dissent,98 Justice Stevens embraced the Posner
approach. Stevens demonstrated that Congress amended the
statute to override the Court's holding in Alyeska Pipeline Ser-
93. Id at 514. The context of this quotation is illuminating. Immediately
prior to the quotation, Judge Posner wrote:
We are quite aware that appeals to literalism are common. The cases
are thick with references to "plain meaning" and with such tired saws
as that interpretation must begin with the words of the statute-and
stop there if they are clear. In fact, interpretation must begin with
the linguistic and cultural competence presupposed by the author of
the statute.... [J]udges realize in their heart of hearts that the su-
perficial clarity to which they are referring when they call the mean-
ing of a statute "plain" is treacherous footing for interpretation. They
know that statutes are purposive utterances and that language is a
slippery medium in which to encode a purpose. They know that legis-
latures, including the Congress of the United States, often legislate in
haste, without considering fully the potential application of their
words to novel settings. The presence of haste here is suggested by
the fact that the civil rights fees statute was passed on the last day of
the Ninety-Fourth Congress.
Id. at 513-14 (citation omitted).
94. 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991). For a thoughtful analysis of this opinion, see T.
Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A Com-
ment on Plain Meaning, West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and
Due Process of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REV. 687 (1992).
95. 111 S. Ct. at 1148.
96. See id.
97. Id. at 1141. Justice Scalia explained that if attorney's fees and expert
fees are not "distinct items of expense .... dozens of statutes referring to the
two separately become an inexplicable exercise in redundancy." Id. at 1143.
98. See id. at 1148-56 (Stevens, J., joined by Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting).
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vice Co. v. Wilderness Society,9 9 which had generally forbidden
judicial fee-shifting in public interest litigation absent express
statutory authority. For Stevens, the legislative history made
clear that Congress intended to return to "the pre-Alyeska
practice in which courts could shift fees, including expert wit-
ness fees, and make those who acted as private attorneys gen-
eral whole again, thus encouraging the enforcement of the civil
rights laws."' °  The case under consideration was "precisely
the type of public interest litigation that Congress intended to
encourage by amending [the statute] to provide for fee shift-
ing," and, thus, the majority's denial of expert fees was "at war
with the congressional purpose of making the prevailing party
whole."' 0 '
But what of Scalia's point that a "usurpation" occurs when
judges move beyond plain textual meaning? Justice Stevens ac-
knowledged the Court's recent "vacillat[ions] between a purely
literal approach to the task of statutory interpretation and an
approach that seeks guidance from historical context, legisla-
tive history, and prior cases identifying the purpose that moti-
vated the legislation."'01 2 Stevens argued that the choice of
method should be dictated by an ultimate respect for Congress,
not for statutory text. Stevens cited numerous instances in
which Congress has not disturbed purposive interpretations in
tension with plain textual meaning, but has responded with
statutory amendments to override textualist interpretations. 0 3
For Stevens, the Court "do[es] the country a disservice when
we needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of Congress' actual
purpose and require it 'to take the time to revisit the matter'
and to restate its purpose in more precise English whenever its
work product suffers from an omission or inadvertent error.' 10 4
Stevens concluded with a prophetic utterance: "Only time
will tell," he wrote, "whether the Court, with its literal reading
of § 1988, has correctly interpreted the will of Congress with re-
spect to the issue it has resolved today."' 0 5 To Scalia, this was
99. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
100. Ill S. Ct. at 1153.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1153-54.
103. See id at 1154-55. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991)
(providing extensive documentation of the circumstances in which Congress
has overridden the Court, and positing theoretical explanations for these
events based on positive political theory).
104. 111 S. Ct. at 1155 (footnote omitted).
105. Id at 1156.
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double foolishness: it looked past the conventional silliness in
interpretation-the search for the (oxymoronic) legislative in-
tent of the enacting Congress-to a heightened form of folly, in
suggesting that his opinion was wrong if the current Congress
repudiated it. "The 'will of Congress' we look to," responded
Scalia, "is not a will evolving from Session to Session, but a will
expressed and fixed in a particular enactment.' 106
Stevens did prove a good prophet: in the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Congress amended the statute expressly to provide for
the recovery of expert fees in some cases. 10 7 Casey thus pro-
vides an especially good illustration of the difference that statu-
tory interpretation theory can make, both to the outcome in a
given case and to the potential congressional response. Is its
story a repudiation of textualism-a tale in which Congress was
needlessly called upon to correct a Supreme Court decision that
reached a dysfunctional outcome through wooden,
hyperformalistic methods? Or are Casey and its aftermath a
vindication of textualism-a vivid example of the Court forcing
Congress to choose statutory language carefully in a specific
area and, more generally, firing a warning shot across the legis-
lative bow about the consequences of drafting mistakes and
omissions? In other words, was the decision anti-democratic,
democracy forcing, or perhaps simply an example of the rule of
law operating in a democracy-neutral fashion? 08
106. See id. at 1148 n.7 (majority opinion).
107. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988c (West Supp. 1992).
108. Evaluating these questions requires assessing a number of difficult is-
sues, including the degree to which textualism can legitimately carry a banner
of "neutrality," the access that different sorts of "losers" in the Supreme
Court have to the Congress, see Eskridge, supra note 103, and the extent to
which congressional overrides such as the one concerning Casey may have ret-
roactive impact. Incidentally, the potential retroactive impact of legislative
changes in law is a hot current topic, with Justice Scalia arguing for a strong
presumption against retroactivity. See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837 (1990) (O'Connor, J.) (acknowledging tension be-
tween two lines of precedent, one favoring retroactivity, one presuming
against it); ic. at 840-58 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing for a strong presump-
tion of nonretroactivity). At this writing, five circuits have held that the 1991
Civil Rights Act, which includes the provision overriding Casey, does not have
retroactive impact. See Gersman v. Group Health Assoc., 975 F.2d. 886 (D.C.
Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1992); Mozee v.
American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir.), cert denied,
113 S. Ct. 207 (1992); Fray v. Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir.
1992); Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 86 (1992). But see Davis v. City of San Francisco, 61 U.S.L.W. 2192 (9th Cir.
Oct. 6, 1992) (holding that the Act applies to cases pending at the time of its
enactment, and to pre-Act conduct still open to challenge after enactment).
[Vol. 77:241
1992] STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 267
As Casey demonstrates, the dispute about statutory inter-
pretation transcends the law schools, and even the legal com-
munity, and appropriately belongs in the political marketplace
of our society. It cannot be resolved without a firm sense of the
nature and mission of our governmental institutions, of the role
of the rule of law in a democracy, and of the potential accom-
plishments and limitations of our legal community. As such, it
poses a fundamental challenge to law student and law professor
alike, the reach of which may exceed our collective grasps. But
then, what's a law school for?

